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The global financial and economic turmoil of the early twenty-first century has
stimulated a renewed interest in earlier world financial crises, in particular the
Great Depression that followed the Wall Street Crash of October 1929. The three
meticulously researched papers that appear here are significant additions to this
literature, shedding new light on Japanese financial, monetary and fiscal policy in
the interwar years. As might be expected, they are diverse in their specific focus of
analysis, but in all cases they are far more than just specialist studies of Japanese
policy in one particular period, illuminating though that would be. They help us
to locate Japan in a global and international context; to understand the extent to
which Japan was increasingly an international player whose policies mattered to
others; and encourage us to think about how a greater understanding of Japan not
only contributes to global history, but can also stimulate both cross-temporal and
cross-country comparative history. While the specific time periods on which the
authors focus also vary, the three papers share an ability and willingness to
consider that time period in a longer term context – back to the Meiji period
and the late nineteenth century, and forward through the high growth period to
the 1990s – in appropriate recognition of the importance of the ongoing historical
dynamic without which any analysis of institutional change is likely to be ren-
dered meaningless. What also becomes clear is the extent to which monetary,
financial and fiscal policies are integral parts of a broader policy package of
mutually reinforcing and conflicting components.
Andrea Revelant’s paper focusses on Japan’s efforts at fiscal reform, particu-
larly in the 1930s. The tax burden in Japan was historically low and very unevenly
distributed, and the authorities were faced with the dilemma of how to increase
government revenue (and stabilise public finance) without damaging the
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economy, while at the same time addressing the distributional issue and not
further overburdening the rural sector or the growing middle class. As Revelant
shows, attempts to undertake a radical structural reform of taxation foundered on
an ongoing desire to foster the growth and competitiveness of the industrial and
urban sector, at least until the growing pressures of war after 1937 eventually
pushed for larger government in conjunction with economic growth. Despite this,
however, the wartime years failed to mark a complete discontinuity in fiscal policy,
with elements of the same dilemma persisting through postwar decades, albeit
masked to a certain extent by rural subsidies and high rates of national growth.
As with fiscal structures, the interwar monetary regime that is the focus of
Steve Bryan’s paper also owed a great deal to the pre-First World War decades,
with Japan initially joining the British-dominated international gold standard in
1897. As Bryan argues, however, there were fundamental changes in gold stan-
dard practice and discourse after its suspension during the war years. As the
industrialised countries in the early 1920s pondered whether or not to return to
gold, and, if so, at what parity, they did so in a new context, in which strict rules
replaced the ability to exercise discretion, and national objectives were increas-
ingly subjected to international constraints. Above all, the interwar gold standard
regime replaced the expansionism and free trade associated with the pre-World
War I system with an emphasis on contraction and protectionism. Given the price
rises of the war years, Japan could either have allowed the exchange rate to
depreciate or try and bring down its prices, and Bryan argues that the stated
desire to return to gold at the prewar par, achieved to disastrous effect in January
1930, was ultimately a search for affirmation overseas, supported at home only by
financial institutions, the national media and a relatively small number of well-
off Japanese, to the detriment of the broad mass of Japanese citizens.
Mark Metzler’s paper, which also focusses primarily on the years up to 1932,
takes further the binary conflict between positive and negative fiscal and mone-
tary policy, between expansionism and contractionism, identified in the other
two papers. Metzler argues that analysis of Japanese policy-making in the period
1913–1932 shows that apart from broad policy swings of the kind associated with
crisis, war and revolution, it is possible to identify shorter-term policy swings in
line with changes in party politics and cabinets, that is, policy swings within a
single policy regime that are not just characterised by opportunistic opposition,
but are based on a consistent set of policy differences. Budgetary expenditure
was a core area of debate between different political strands, and these debates
were in turn reflected in other areas, including monetary and exchange rate
policy, fiscal policy, social and industrial policy, and even diplomatic and
military policy. Like Bryan, Metzler identifies the extent to which international
influences tended to reinforce the “negative” or “contractionary” policy set,
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something also found in the binary “reformist vs. conservative” frame of mind
that contributed to the faltering of radical proposals for tax reform in the 1930s
described by Revelant.
Together, therefore, these papers are more than the sum of their parts. They
do a great deal to help us understand better the swings and tensions within
Japanese economic policymaking in the interwar years, and how they may be
located in a longer term historical dynamic and in international and comparative
context. Metzler goes as far as comparing the policy swings of the 1920s with
those of the 1990s. We are, of course, left with many remaining questions, as the
authors themselves would be the first to acknowledge. What remains particu-
larly unclear, perhaps, is the nature of the fundamental motivations underlying
the various policy prescriptions that were put forward. There is abundant
evidence of the importance of vested interests, the chance of economic or
political gain, and genuinely held beliefs. Financial interests, for example
were often at odds with industrial ones, but involvement in international trade
and monetary flows might change that configuration of interests. Much remains
to be done to understand how the overall policy package identified by Metzler
came together, and could be sustained in the face of fluctuating circumstances.
Moreover, economic decisions, as we know, are influenced by perceptions and
not just reality, and game theory can perhaps take us only so far in under-
standing why particular policies are advocated or adopted. Bryan does venture
into this area, suggesting that when it came to determining an appropriate parity
for returning the yen to gold, the bottom line was that any suggestion that the
exchange rate might be allowed to depreciate was identified with moral fallibi-
lity, and, above all, seen as an indicator of Japan’s lack of international prestige.
And this is where a tension between perception and reality that dominates this
period of Japan’s history becomes apparent, as the desire for international status
and prestige was in many respects at odds with Japan’s economic status in the
interwar years. As Revelant emphasizes, it was far more difficult to address the
issues of fiscal reform given that Japan was still a relatively low income country
with a large rural population and an ongoing need to sustain urban and
industrial development, particularly in the years prior to 1932, when the
exchange rate policy had only served to exacerbate the effects of the interna-
tional depression. This still “developing economy” status underlay many of the
tensions in Japan’s economic and financial policy through much of the interwar
period, and severely constrained the ability of all Japanese policymakers to act
in ways that both they, and their international counterparts, might regard as
desirable. None of the authors here comment specifically on the mismatch
between Japan’s weak economic fundamentals and her ambition for interna-
tional respectability, status and power, something which was to shape the
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course of the Pacific War, but Metzler’s analysis of earlier policy shifts could,
perhaps, be usefully continued through the 1930s to shed further light on this
area. Whatever the case, these three carefully researched and innovative papers
take forward our understanding of this crucial period for the international
economy, and Japan’s role within it, and lay down new research agendas for
the future.
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